Autonomous.
Not unsupervised.
Giving an agent real access to the systems that run your business is the part that stops most teams. Agents never reach your tools directly: every call passes through a layer that decides before it runs, pauses the risky ones for a human, and records what happened. You start open and tighten where it matters, rather than fighting a lockdown on day one.
- Allowedhubspot · contacts.searchread · matches policy
- Approvalstripe · refunds.createwrite · held for a human
- Deniedpostgres · customers.deletedestructive · blocked by policy
Decide, then act, then record
The agent asks for a tool
The agent does not hold your credentials and cannot call a system directly. Every request goes through the governed layer.
Policy decides before anything runs
Your rules for that workspace, connection and step are evaluated together, and the strictest one wins. The decision happens before execution, not as a report afterwards.
Allow, approve, or deny, and record it
Routine calls proceed, the ones you flagged wait for a person, and blocked ones never execute. All three outcomes land in the trail.
Control that holds under pressure
Checked before it runs
Authorization happens per tool call, not once per workflow, so an agent cannot drift into actions the run was never meant to take.
Fail-closed by default
If the check cannot be completed for any reason, the call is refused rather than let through. An outage cannot quietly become an open door.
Humans on the risky ones
Any action you class as high-risk pauses and waits for a person to approve it, for as long as the decision takes.
Recorded either way
Every call is logged with the tenant, the person behind it, the connection used and the outcome, including the ones that were refused.
Credentials the agent never sees
Secrets are encrypted per tenant and injected at call time. They are never handed to the model and never stored beside your workflows.
It cannot reach your internal network
Agents cannot reach into private networks or cloud infrastructure endpoints, and the protection holds against redirection tricks that get past a naive address check.
Egress from addresses you can allowlist
Calls to your systems leave from a known, stable set of addresses, so your firewall can allow Spojit specifically instead of opening a hole to the internet.
Three levels, most restrictive wins
Set the posture once for the workspace, tighten it on a specific connection, and narrow it again on an individual workflow step. Where the levels disagree, the strictest one applies.
Test a rule before you rely on it
Ask the simulator whether a given person could call a given tool on a given system, and it answers with the verdict and which rule decided it. No guessing, and no finding out in production.
When an agent touches something that matters
Anything that moves money
Refunds, payouts and credits are the actions where an agent making its own call is least acceptable, and approval belongs in the flow.
Systems of record
Your ERP, CRM and ledger are where a wrong write is expensive to unpick. Reads can flow freely while writes are gated.
Regulated data
When an auditor asks what touched a record and on whose authority, the answer needs to be a query rather than an investigation.
Proving it afterwards
Security reviews ask what an agent is able to do, not just what it did. A per-action policy is an answer you can show.
Governed vs trusted
Most platforms authorize the run. The interesting question is what the agent does after that.
Governed agent actions
- Every call checked against policy before it executes
- High-risk actions wait for a human
- A record of what ran, and what was refused
Trusted agent actions
- Authorized once, then free to act for the rest of the run
- Risky calls indistinguishable from safe ones
- Logs of what succeeded, not of what was attempted
Every run, on the same guarantees
Let an agent near production
Start free and put an agent to work with policy, approvals and a full record from the first run. No card needed.